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ABSTRACT

Given the complexity and multiplicity of goals in natural resource governance, it is not
surprising that policy debates are often characterized by contention and competition. Yet at times
adversaries join together to collaborate to find creative solutions not easily achieved in polarizing
forums. We employed qualitative interviews and a quantitative network analysis to investigate a
collaborative network that formed to develop a resolution to a challenging natural resource
management problem, the conservation of vernal pools. We found that power had become
distributed among members, trust had formed across core interests, and social learning had
resulted in shared understanding and joint solutions. Furthermore, institutions such as who and
when new members joined, norms of inclusion and openness, and the use of small working
groups helped create the observed patterns of power, trust, and learning.
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Introduction

Governance of natural resources is inherently complex, often characterized by contested goals,
uncertain science, and distrust (Lachapelle, McCool, and Patterson 2003; Weible and Sabatier
2009). With multiple interest groups vying for control over the outcome, the solutions to these
problems are often imperfect (Rittel and Webber 1973; Weber and Khademian 2008), but
sometimes public and private actors collaborate to develop better solutions (Acheson and Knight
2000; Schneider et al. 2003). Because collaborative efforts enable participants to create
innovative solutions, it is important to better understand how key aspects such as power, trust,
and learning influence collaborative outcomes (Innes and Booher 2003; Ansell and Gash 2008;
Mandarano 2008; Reed 2008). For example, equalized power can facilitate transparent
discussions, trust can promote information sharing, and learning can lead to a common
understanding of issues. The extent to which the structure of collaborations and the institutions
that govern interactions within them shape power, trust, and learning warrants greater
investigation (Ansell and Gash 2008).

Here we examine a collaboration that formed to create a new instrument for vernal pool
conservation in Maine, and we assess how specific institutions influenced power, trust, and
learning. Drawing on this case and employing qualitative and network analysis methods, we
address three sets of questions: (1) Has power become equalized among participants, and, if so,
what institutions allowed this to occur? (2) Has trust developed across different interest groups,
and, if so, how did trust develop? (3) Has social learning occurred, and, if so, what institutions
enabled learning?

We draw on institutional analysis as a guiding framework. Institutions are rules and norms that
structure repetitive social situations (North 1990; Knight 1992; Ostrom2003). Institutions can be
formal or informal rules that are written, spoken, or tacitly understood (Ostrom 1999; Hardy and
Koontz 2009). Institutions include: boundary rules determining membership; aggregation rules
defining the decision-making process; position rules defining who can act; and information rules
determining how information is shared (Sell et al. 2004). Institutions can influence a group’s
ability to achieve policy goals, and therefore, institutional analysis may highlight ways to
improve collaborative partnerships (Blom-Hansen 1997; Skelcher and Sullivan 2008; Johnston et
al. 2011).

Power

Power is the ability to influence how others act or to gain favorable outcomes (Sell et al. 2004).
While getting the right people to the table is important, it is not unusual for participants to arrive
with unequal power, compromising collaborative efforts (Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 2011).
Unequal power may cause less powerful groups to feel their identity threatened, hamper the
ability to mobilize agreement, and result in a lack of commitment to the process (Selsky 2005;
Ansell and Gash 2008).

If a goal of collaborations is for all participants to contribute to joint decision making (Armitage
2005; Koontz 2005), power imbalances must be addressed (Mitchell 2005; Bryson, Crosby, and
Stone 2006). Existing research has identified a range of factors that can empower participants,
including inclusion in the process, access to information, development of status-based power,

and the ability to shape discussions (Huxham et al. 2000; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006;
Webler and Tuler 2006). Institutions can influence all of these factors. Boundary rules limit who
is allowed to be in a group, aggregation rules shape decision making (e.g., giving voice to those
less powerful), position rules decide who has authority to act, and information rules describe how
information is shared (Sell et al. 2004; Ansell and Gash 2008).

Trust

Trust refers to the willingness of an actor to assume risk based upon their positive expectations
of another’s actions (Stern and Coleman 2015). Developing trust may improve collaboration by
increasing information sharing, honest participation, and risk taking during negotiations
(Lachapelle and McCool 2012; Stern and Coleman 2015). Trust may also affect subsequent
implementation of a plan or the likelihood for litigation (Lachapelle and McCool 2012).

Do institutions foster trust? Some scholars stress the psychological dimensions of trust building.
For example, the Advocacy Coalition Framework suggests trust is assigned to those who share
your core beliefs (Leach and Sabatier 2005; Henry and Dietz 2011). Others have found that
institutions can influence trust development. Aggregation rules can allow joint development of
procedures, ensuring transparency and encouraging inclusive discussions (Lachapelle and
McCool 2012; Stern and Baird 2015; Stern and Coleman 2015). Position rules that provide all
participants equal weight and eliminate advisory-only roles can facilitate trust (Koontz 2006).
Norms of reciprocity may encourage increased positive interactions and trust development
(Raymond 2006).

Social Learning

In contentious natural resource venues, actors use data to promote their interests (Layzer 2012),
whereas collaborative efforts often require groups to synthesize expertise from multiple sectors
(Newig et al. 2010). The process of participants learning about each other and the issues and then
developing a joint understanding and solution is considered social learning (Schusler, Decker,
and Pfeffer 2003; Reed et al. 2010; Gerlak and Heikkila 2011). If one of the goals of
collaboration is to develop solutions for problems too complex and contentious for one entity,
social learning is essential (Koontz 2014).

Existing research has identified a range of factors likely to promote social learning, including
inclusiveness, extended engagement, opportunities to exchange information, and process control
and equity (Reed et al. 2010; Koontz 2014). Institutions may be instrumental in facilitating
learning. Information rules determine how new information is acquired and how information is
shared and processed (Newig et al. 2010; Heikkila and Gerlak 2013). Boundary rules can include
participants with diverse perspectives and knowledge, and position rules can prevent actors in
powerful positions from inhibiting information flow (Heikkila and Gerlak 2013). Aggregation
rules that encourage participants to develop their own processes can encourage social learning,
especially if the decentralized process facilitates acquisition of information from outside the
group and promotes deliberation (Heikkila and Gerlak 2013; Koontz 2014).

Network Structure

Network analysis examines network structures quantitatively to better understand network
function (Janssen et al. 2006; DeLeon and Varda 2009; Dempwolf and Lyles 2012). Scholars
have used network analysis to show that governments with politically similar constituents are
more likely to collaborate because political homophily reduces the transaction costs of
establishing connections (Gerber et al. 2013), and that collaborative planning can build social
capital by building new relationships between organizations (Mandarano 2009).

In evaluating power, trust, and learning, network analysis has indicated that actors who hold
central positions may be more powerful because they are better situated to exert influence over
others and to access key information (Bodin and Crona 2009), especially if they hold a brokerage
position connecting other actors (Fernandez and Gould 1994; Marcum, Bevc, and Butts 2012).
Dense networks are likely to be characterized by trust because connections between members
can facilitate feelings of group identity (Coleman 1990; Bodin, Crona, and Ernstson 2006). If
participants only trust those who hold similar beliefs, the network would exhibit greater
homophily, or groupings of similar individuals (Gerber, Henry, and Lubell 2013). A dense
network with low centrality may facilitate social learning because information can be transmitted
and deliberated more easily (Newig, Gunther, and Pahl-Wostl 2010). Greater homophily also
eases information exchange, but could inhibit acquisition of new information (Granovetter 1973;
Granovetter 1983).

Study Context

Our research focuses on a collaboration to develop a new mechanism to conserve vernal pools in
Maine. Vernal pools in the northeastern United States are small (generally <0.5 ha), seasonal
wetlands in forested landscapes (Calhoun et al. 2014). They support a specialized suite of
amphibians, provide habitat for state-listed invertebrates and reptiles, and supply ecosystem
services beyond what would be expected by their small size (Hunter 2005). Vernal pools are
threatened by development that directly impacts pools and fragments adjacent forests that
provide amphibian postbreeding habitat and travel corridors (Calhoun, Miller, and Klemens
2005).

In 2007, the Maine legislature amended the Natural Resources Protection Act to regulate
development within 250 ft of exemplary vernal pools. In addition, the Army Corps of Engineers
reviews development around vernal pools on properties where waters of the United States will be
dredged or filled (Burne and Griffin 2005). Stakeholders believe the regulations either unduly
burden individual landowners and hinder development, or, conversely, inadequately protect the
resource (Jansujwicz et al. 2013). Tensions came to a head in 2011 when existing regulations
were under attack in both legislative and media forums (e.g., Bell 2011).

To address this challenge, University of Maine researcher Calhoun engaged key stakeholders in
discussions about alternative regulatory strategies, starting with six people in 2010. Participation
grew over time, and by 2014, approximately 50 individuals representing two municipalities, four
state agencies, three federal agencies, land trusts, development and real estate interests, private

consultants, and university researchers had participated in the process (Table 1). The
collaboration did not include public participation. Members met in a large group to share
relevant information and develop a proposed mechanism, as well as in subgroups that emerged
as needed: ecologists developing criteria for identifying exemplary vernal pools; a mapping
group; developers and economists analyzing market conditions and developing a fee mechanism;
a “human dimensions” group focused on policy issues; and a Special Areas Management Plan
(SAMP) group writing the new regulatory document. Subgroup meetings were open for anyone
to attend. The collaboration is currently in the final stages of adopting a SAMP to enable the
proposed mechanism to be implemented and evaluated in two participating municipalities.

Methods

Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis

We employed a sequential mixed-methods approach (Creswell 2014) in which we used
participant observation (DeWalt and DeWalt 2011) to inform a targeted collection of qualitative
and quantitative data. Authors Levesque and Calhoun were co-participants, attending all 45
collaboration meetings from 2010 through to data analysis in 2014. Calhoun functioned as a
coordinator, and Levesque was a graduate student conducting research; both contributed to
discussions, provided information, and interacted with other members. As active participants, we
influenced the very phenomenon that we studied. A greater degree of participation allowed a
more complete grasp of the context from an insider’s perspective and the capacity to draw on

personal experience during formal analysis (Patton 2002). Throughout the analysis, we were
aware of our own biases and were careful to ensure findings were grounded in data.

After 3 years of participant observation, the senior author interviewed all members who had
attended three or more collaborative meetings as of August 2013. These 28 interviewees spanned
the organizations and interests in the collaboration (Table 1). A semistructured interview guide
was tested with nonparticipants and revised prior to use. To understand power dynamics we
asked questions such as “Who was the most influential and why?”

To explore trust, we asked about process components that are often associated with trust in the
literature. For example, given the possible effects of including a wide range of interests on trust
development, we asked, “What is the effect of having this particular mix of interests in the
group?” To investigate learning, we asked a series of questions about what and how participants
learned, such as “What have you learned as a result of participating?” To augment our own
observations of institutions, we asked respondents to describe the collaboration with questions
such as “What are some distinguishing characteristics of this process?” Additionally, respondents
were asked about their core policy beliefs.

Face-to-face interviews lasted 1–2 hours and were recorded and transcribed. Using an iterative
coding process (Yin 2010) and NVivo (v.10) software, the senior author initially coded data
using a deductive process under broad categories of power, trust, learning, institutions, and
policy beliefs. These themes were further coded using an inductive process into subcategories

that explained broad categories (Yin 2010). For example, the broad category trust was further
coded into subcategories: trust descriptions, formation, and influence on the process.

Network Data Collection and Analysis

Our network analysis is based on meeting attendance records from January 2010 through June
2013 (after Voets, Van Dooren, and De Rynck 2008; Newig et al. 2010). Attendance provides a
two-mode, actor-by-event matrix, which, given our analytical focus on actor relationships, we
converted to a one-mode actor-by-actor matrix (Borgatti and Everett 1997; Borgatti 2009). Once
converted, our network measures indicate who co-attended meetings. We employed one-mode
analysis methods in UCINET (Borgatti 2009; Jasny 2012).

For insights on power, we measured degree centrality, or the number of participants with whom
an actor has co-attended meetings (Bodin and Crona 2009; Prell 2012), as well as Freeman’s
network centralization measure (Sandström and Rova 2010). We also assigned actors to their
organization and calculated mean brokerage scores for each organization (Fernandez and Gould
1994; Stevenson and Greenberg 2000).

To measure the extent of trust, we used network density. To test the degree to which participants
trust those who hold similar interests, we assigned each actor their core policy belief and used
the E-I index, which compares the strength of ties external to each group to those within each
group (Vance-Borland and Holley 2011). The index can range from -1 (homophily) to 1
(heterophily). We used an analysis of variance (ANOVA) model to test whether observed

patterns were significant. Because the ties between actors are not independent observations, the
ANOVA models used by UCINET uses 5000 trials of random permutations of ties to which the
actual network is compared.

We utilized the measures of network density, centralization, and homophily to better understand
the network structures associated with social learning.

Results

Power

As expected, some participants entered the collaboration inherently wielding greater power due
to their regulatory positions. This was especially true of the Army Corps representatives, as
described by one participant, “[She] seems to play an important role but that’s her institution—I
mean, she’s the biggest regulatory hammer in the room.” Despite the inherent power of some
participants, by 4 years into the process, no one person or organization stood out as being the
most powerful:

Obviously the Corps is going to have some element of final say in the Special
Area Management Plan because it’s their thing, but the contents will be the
product of a lot of interests’ influence, as opposed to the Corps saying this is what
we want and this is how it’s going to be, take it or leave it.

In fact, most respondents named six to eight people from multiple organizations when asked who
had the most influence.

The network analysis further indicates power was fairly well distributed. Degree centrality scores
averaged 22.5 ties across all actors, and ranged from 13.8 to 33.3 within each organization
(Figure 1 and Table 2). The Freeman centrality measure for the whole network is 56.29%. The
university group members have a high mean brokerage score (549.1) (Table 2), but large
standard deviations of brokerage scores suggest that some members in all subgroups are more
likely to be brokers, and group affiliation matters less.

We examined the role of institutions in dispersing power. Boundary rules that brought critical
thinkers into the process and position rules that enabled multiple types of authority to emerge
were both critical for power shifts. In particular, some participants were recognized for providing
essential contributions, while others were cited as advancing the discussion by asking critical
questions. For example, a developer commanded the attention and respect of others because “he
is very good at explaining things from his perspective, knowing that people are coming from
different camps.” Some town representatives were identified as powerful because they ground
truthed the proposed mechanism, letting others know whether it would be feasible. Thus, the
institutions ensured that the best thinkers and experts were contributing members of the group.

Further, aggregation rules that shaped decision processes ensured these members were afforded
the opportunity to participate in a meaningful manner, helping to distribute power. In particular,
group discussions were often cited as essential; it was through discussions that participants

learned of each other’s expertise. Participants felt that ideas were openly shared and debated
during discussions; “this has been one of those discussions … where leadership is from
persuasion rather than authority … People are continuing to engage in the conversation because
they see an opportunity to influence the outcome.” Respondents noted that open discussions were
due at least partly to those coordinating the group; one university coordinator was described as
“not driving the bus,” “not ego driven,” and “being committed to finding a solution,” despite her
own expertise. In sum, institutions that helped equalize power were those that included critical
thinkers from multiple backgrounds, acknowledged different types of knowledge, and promoted
open-minded discussions.

Trust

Respondents identified trust in the process and each other. For example, one respondent stated,
“I’m impressed by some of the relationships that [the coordinators] have built up … Those kinds
of relationships take a lot of time and trust … to develop … I think because of that, people say
things at meetings that they wouldn’t otherwise.” Another interviewee noted, “It seems like we
worked through some initial lack of trust issues. There are some people at the table who are
probably used to being adversaries; we worked through all that and everybody came to realize
that this was a win–win proposition.” This level of trust seems to have established in spite of—or
perhaps because of—the range of interests participating in the process. According to one
participant, having a full mix of interests has built trust and credibility in the process. Many
participants felt the process was more likely to produce good outcomes because trust was
present; one respondent stated, “I think it has evolved over time to where everybody feels really

committed to seeing a workable outcome. And I think that only happens when you give the
process enough time for trust to develop between stakeholders.”

The network analysis supports the finding that trust developed within the large group. The
overall density of the network is 0.457, suggesting a fairly dense network. Within-group
densities did show some variation (Table 2), with the most densely tied group being university
representatives, three of whom attended almost all the meetings. The E-I index for the network
of 0.2563 shows heterophily. Weaker ties are observed within most interest groups (ecology,
economics, governance) than between the groups, and the density of ties within interest groups is
not significantly different than what is found in a randomly generated network
(R2 ൌ .071, p ൌ.08).

Our analysis suggests three key institutions that help build trust. First, respondents named
informal norms such as respectful dialogue that strengthened trust. One interviewee said that
even at meetings where people get passionate about their ideas, “the way that we talk to each
other, the way we listen to each other and respond to other comments and ideas has been very
respectful.” These interactions were likely shaped by ground rules that promoted respect: “It’s
really kudos to [the coordinators] for infusing and informing the process with a commitment to
actually do this in as open and inclusive way as is possible, without which there would be no
trust.”

Second, aggregation rules encouraged the use of subgroups that also built trust. A consultant who
had been at initial subgroup meetings with developers stated

That first meeting with the developers, I felt like they came in here thinking, “Oh,
no, here’s another environmental regulation. We’re going to have to fight this.”
… We spent basically two hours with them explaining the process, answering
questions … Then as we went on, there was much more a sense of trust in each
other and trust that we were trying to make something that was going to work for
everyone.

The subgroups, while convened to discuss detailed information, allowed participants with similar
interests to talk about their concerns. Yet use of subgroups could backfire if the larger group
began to question what went on in the small groups. One respondent noted

You provided spaces for people to be a little more candid … That seems to be
working well. You haven’t lost trust. When you bring people together as a full
group it doesn’t seem like they’re suspicious of what’s happening at those small
meetings and I think it takes a really good process to balance that out.

Finally, trust does not appear to be a function of holding a similar core policy belief. One reason
may be that new interests came to the group over time. For example, the initial meeting of
developers was suggested by a town official 18 months into the process after initial distrust
between regulators and municipalities was resolved. At the time of the interviews, a few
participants realized that the large state environmental advocacy group was not represented. An
interviewee explained, “The reason not to have involved [the advocacy group earlier] is I think it
would have been harder … to build that level of trust.” Group members saw the value of

bringing in this new perspective and felt ready to allow the dialog. Thus, boundary rules that
guide participant selection included an element of time that was essential in trust formation. In
brief, ground rules that established respectful discussion, use of subgroups, and staggered
inclusion of stakeholder interests are the institutions that promoted trust.

Learning

All respondents reported learning about new subject areas or perspectives. For example, a
developer stated, “To me a vernal pool was something I wanted to run a bulldozer over every
April so it didn’t exist anymore … I don’t quite think that way anymore, I go ‘Okay, that’s an
important part of an ecosystem. What do we do?’” Respondents also report learning about and
developing respect for each other’s expertise. A state regulator stated, “I’m never in a room with
a bunch of planners where they are really thinking about [growth planning] … [Participating
town] is not a big built up area … but they’ve obviously thought about it.”

In addition, participants developed a shared understanding of the issues and joint solutions as a
result of group discussions. One respondent, noting how everyone contributed, said, “It seems
like there’s a lot of people cooperating to build up a shared understanding.” Others also indicated
that they had collectively “bounced ideas” off each other. One respondent noted, as the group
grew to include new perspectives, “ideas … or complications have been introduced, pitfalls have
been brought up that have to be overcome, and so the [group’s] ideas evolved.”

We observed that ideas evolved at least partly from deep deliberation about the proposed
mechanism, with members expressing strong, conflicting opinions. Debates would continue over
the course of multiple meetings before the group would come to an agreement. For example, one
contentious decision was how to determine an impact fee. Over the course of many months,
participants shared data about development and conservation costs, views on what role the towns
should play, and ideas about other conservation funding sources. Eventually, as the members
came to understand and accept each other’s needs and perspectives, they agreed upon a trial
impact fee structure.

Several institutions helped facilitate social learning. First, we observed that boundary rules that
determine who participates in the process were flexible; as new experts and perspectives were
needed, the relevant participants were invited to join the group. For example, a real estate
appraiser was invited as the group was determining a fee structure that depended upon appraised
property values. Second, the coordinators instilled informal rules about inclusion and listening,
as mentioned by a town representative: “The [coordinators] always allow for everybody to speak
… You don’t get this level of information … in a typical case.” This norm of inclusion was
reflected by several respondents, such as, “People are listening to one another, hearing different
perspectives, trying to synthesize … I’ve seen it happen where the agencies are really running
things. Here … the process is letting different types of knowledge emerge.”

Finally, aggregation rules encouraged the use of subgroups. These smaller groups enabled indepth discussion by experts, so that the large group benefited from their deliberations. For
example, developing criteria for protecting vernal pools took many meetings of mostly ecologists

relying on biological data that might have been too complicated or uninteresting to the rest of the
group. Information and recommendations from subgroups would be presented at the next large
group meeting for discussion. One respondent commented on how the subgroups help the larger
group move forward, saying, “They bring information to the table that I may be familiar with but
I can’t bring it with the authority and direct experience they have.”

Our network measures support the finding that the structure of the collaboration was one that
could facilitate social learning. The network’s Freeman centrality score is 56.29% and the
density is 0.457; a dense network that isn’t dominated by a central leader is more likely to be
able to share information and deliberate. The E-I index of 0.2563 shows the heterogeneity of the
large group, where diverse interests are available to contribute different perspectives and
knowledge (Newig et al. 2010). Thus, including multiple perspectives, encouraging sharing of
ideas, and using subgroups facilitated the social learning that helped the group develop a joint
solution.

Discussion

We identified a collaboration in which power was distributed among members, trust formed
across core interests, and social learning resulted in shared understanding and joint solutions. We
found evidence that the collaboration’s institutions helped achieve these conditions.

Power

We found many nonregulatory participants influenced outcomes because of what they
contributed to the process. This finding is consistent with Thye (2000), who suggested that the
assignment of power due to status helps equalize power instead of causing a power struggle.
Recognizing the influence of members beyond regulators allowed the group to focus on what
ideas would best contribute to a successful policy proposal. Three institutional aspects helped
participants equalize power: (1) boundary rules that selected participants who were critical
thinkers yet open-minded; (2) position rules that allowed different types of authority to emerge;
and (3) aggregation rules that valued good ideas from anyone during decision making.

While the network analysis also suggested that power was fairly evenly distributed (e.g., low
network centrality, brokers in most subgroups), it was less helpful in exploring why power
equalized. The interview responses were necessary to understand the institutions that facilitated
power sharing. Additionally, brokerage measures suggested that university representatives yield
disproportional influence in the group. While two university members did keep the process
moving, interviews suggest they did not exercise greater power over the outcomes. Network
analysis overemphasized their power and did not accurately portray status-based power of others.
Future work could develop network tests that account for power distribution as a result of status
perceptions. In addition, future network analysis could examine how structures change over time
to support or challenge qualitative findings that power shifts as collaborations evolve.

Trust

We found that trust developed across individuals with different interests. Both the network
structure (i.e., a dense, heterogeneous group), and the qualitative analysis supported this finding.
We had expected core beliefs to be a greater determinant of trust, given the highly contentious
context from which this group emerged. Lessons from our study may help to elucidate how
institutions build trust. First, norms that promote inclusive and respectful dialogue were
essential; as participants saw their own and others’ opinions taken seriously, trust grew. Second,
aggregation rules that determine decision processes included subgroups that allowed participants
who share similar interests to express concerns in a safe environment, after which they could
participate more constructively in the full group. The use of subgroups was paired with a
transparent process so that trust was maintained in the large group. Third, the boundary rules of
who participated included an element of time. While the participation of diverse interests made
the process credible and trustworthy, the new interests were brought in slowly. This finding
supports Johnston et al. (2011), who state that the rapid inclusion of many stakeholders risks the
ability to build trust within a group.

While we examined trust broadly, other researchers have separated out different components of
trust (e.g., Stern and Coleman 2015). Future research could explore which components of trust
are most important for successful collaboration and what institutions support them. Additionally,
participants’ responses suggested ownership over the process, proposed by others to be critical to
trust development (Webler and Tuler 2006; Lachapelle and McCool 2012); future research could
examine the way in which institutions support feelings of ownership.

Learning

We found that not only did participants learn content and other perspectives, but also, as a group,
they engaged in deep deliberation essential for jointly solving a controversial problem. The
network analysis indicated the network was fairly dense without a strong central leader, both of
which may suggest that participants are interacting in ways that could expose them to diverse
knowledge and ideas. Further, the network exhibited heterophily, enabling the group to benefit
from a broad range of expertise. However, again we find that network analysis can identify
characteristics of the collaboration associated with learning, but is less helpful in determining the
institutions that enabled a diverse group to become deliberative.

Our qualitative results provide greater insight into the development of social learning. First,
boundary rules that determine participants were adaptable, bringing in new expertise as needed.
Second, the norms of inclusion and listening were well known by participants; by encouraging
everyone to share their knowledge, the group as a whole had the opportunity to develop a
collective understanding. Third, the use of subgroups allowed experts to delve deeply into
specific aspects of issues and bring informed recommendations back to the larger group.

Conclusion

While our research contributes to a growing understanding of collaborative efforts, it also raises
new questions. For example, how do coordinators who also participate in a collaboration
influence the dynamics of power, trust, and learning? Are rules established by coordinators or do

they emerge from group processes? Power, trust, and learning all appear to change over time, but
how do they influence each other and how should collaborations evolve in response? Our
research also has some limitations. Because our results are drawn from a single, well-functioning
collaboration, future research is needed to explore power, trust, and learning in poorly
functioning collaborations. Additionally, like other network analyses that struggle to relate
structure to function (Sandström and Carlsson 2008), the use of meeting attendance as basis for
analysis limits our understanding of more complex network relationships. However, qualitative
data provided additional insight into how institutions govern interactions within the network
structures we found.

Interestingly, similar institutions influenced power, trust, and learning. For example, boundary
rules selected critical thinkers (equalizing power) and brought in new interests over time
(establishing trust), both of which also facilitated social learning. The use of subgroups provided
avenues for trust to build and for learning to occur. Likewise, certain network structures were
important; this collaboration was dense, decentralized, and heterogeneous, all which facilitate
trust and learning. Hence, process dynamics such as power, trust, and learning are likely
interdependent. Our results support others who suggest that institutions shape how collaborations
function (Sell et al. 2004; Imperial 2005; Hardy and Koontz 2009); future research could focus
on how specific institutions simultaneously influence interrelated process components. By better
understanding the institutions that enable successful partnership, more policy forums can evolve
from contention to collaboration.
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